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The law of takings, with its ever expanding subject matter,
is a sprawling affair with little intellectual coherence. Takings
now include, at the very least, the following roughly-defined
categories: (1) government or government-authorized physical oc-
cupation of private property;' (2) government regulation of the
use or disposition of property still owned, albeit in truncated
form, by private individuals;2 and (3) the imposition of price
structures intended (ideally) to limit the monopoly power of pub-
lic utilities while providing their owners a reasonable rate of re-
turn.3 The standards of review applied to these takings corre-
spond to the type of case. Exacting (if not quite strict) scrutiny is
required whenever the government permanently dispossesses an
owner of a property interest. Rational basis review regrettably
seems to be the order of the day for regulatory takings, even
though this prohibition has been frayed a bit around the edges in
land use cases.4 Last, some form of intermediate scrutiny is ap-
plied in rate of return cases; that is, courts allow the government
substantial discretion over the mechanics of rate-setting, so long
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as the regulated firm receives a "bottom line" return appropriate
to its level of risk.'
Within this general framework, the least problematic cases
are those in which state regulation limits the private owner's
right to exclude. The normal rules of private law treat the right
to exclude as an indispensable element of property, limited
chiefly by a defense of necessity but subject to an obligation to
compensate for any harm. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any
property as private if the right to exclude is rejected. The prop-
erty becomes, at least in part, a commons once others can enter
at will, such that the owner deserves compensation, not for the
total value of the property, but for the loss of its exclusive status.
By stressing this element of exclusivity, I do not want to discount
the importance of other elements in the bundle of property
rights-most notably those of use and disposition-that today re-
ceive only limited protection under the law of takings. But I do
hope to demonstrate that the attenuation of the right to exclude
represents yet another unfortunate development in the modern
law of takings.
In order to undertake this task, I proceed in four stages. In
the first section, I contrast two approaches to the law of takings,
one that treats takings disputes as derivative of or dependent on
private law conceptions of property, and the second which does
not. I argue that only the first maintains the integrity of consti-
tutional doctrine, while the second, in common use today, affords
insufficient protection against the expansion of state power. Sec-
ond, I examine the status of the right to exclude as part of the
basic bundle of property rights, chiefly in connection with Kaiser
Aetna v United States,6 which announced the premier status of
the right to exclude. Third, I look at the range of justifications,
beyond those of private necessity, that are said to limit the scope
of the right to exclude, chiefly in connection with the watershed
case of PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins,7 decided shortly af-
ter Kaiser Aetna. Finally, I look at some of the cases subsequent
to PruneYard.
I. TWO ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES
The initial question is how best to approach those takings
cases that threaten the right to exclude. The ideal approach does
not treat disputes between individuals and the state as sui gene-
Duquesne Light Co v Barasch, 488 US 299, 314 (1989).
' 444 US 164 (1979).
447 US 74 (1980).
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ris. Rather, it assumes that the state has the same power as any
private individual, and asks whether a private party has the un-
qualified right to act as the state intends to act. If so, then the
state can act without compensating the individual who complains
of its action. Conversely, where a private individual cannot im-
pose his will on others, the state, in order to advance the public
use, can have its way only if it compensates the affected party.
This tight connection between private and public disputes arises
because the state functions as the designated agent for the citi-
zens who benefit from its actions in any particular transaction.
The state's right, therefore, to inflict losses on its citizens with-
out compensation is no greater, and no less, than the right of in-
dividuals to inflict losses on each other in their private capaci-
ties.
Unfortunately, the modern constitutional approach wrenches
government action out of the private context, treating govern-
ment takings as sui generis without being tightly moored to any
common law conceptions of property rights. Thus we are told that
the baselines set by the private law do not really matter in con-
stitutional adjudication, and that correlative concepts of property
rights, such as those contained in the law of nuisance, do not
play any special role in setting out the uses of and limitations on
government power.8
The rejection of one standard of adjudication requires at
least the implicit acceptance of a second. Once the private law is
shunted aside, however, constitutional adjudication falls exclu-
sively in the slippery arena of public law. No alternative substan-
tive baseline is proposed; rather, the entire debate takes as its
point of departure matters of administrative process (the right to
participate in public debate and then to be outvoted, as it were)
and adopts a stance of judicial deference to official action. Be-
cause this approach necessarily rejects any strong conception of
individual rights, the deprivation of those rights fails to set off
any constitutional alarms. The evisceration of the public use re-
quirement in modern takings cases depends heavily on the defer-
ential attitude taken toward government regulation both state
and federal,9 as does the elastic set of legitimate state interests
See, for example, Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272, 279-80 (1928) (Private law of nui-
sance does not limit the power of the state to cut down cedar trees from which pests
spread to more valuable apple trees.).
See, for example, Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 240-44 (1984)
(discussing and approving earlier cases that established a deferential view toward both
state and federal legislative public use determinations); Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co, 467
US 986, 1014-16 (1984) (deferring to congressional public use determination on trade se-
crets under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Berman v Parker,
19971
The University of Chicago Law Review
that are said to justify the regulation of private property without
compensation.' ° The skepticism about the common law baselines
for private property, moreover, is never coupled with the articu-
lation of some alternate baseline or some explanation of how an
alternate approach might function in either public or private law.
Once the court declares intellectual bankruptcy on the concep-
tual analysis, it is only a short step to celebrate the vagaries of
the political and administrative state whose procedural protec-
tions are the newly found substitute for any conception of indi-
vidual rights."
My own approach to takings starts from exactly the opposite
direction. The power of government to regulate and to take is
closely tied to the correlative rights and duties of ordinary indi-
viduals as regulated and determined in common law adjudica-
tion. This position does not require us to pretend that each and
every common law decision is part of some seamless intellectual
web. Obviously, some strong differences of opinion persist re-
garding the application of general common law principles to par-
ticular cases or even entire classes of problems. Constitutional
adjudication thus often forces us to return to that "brooding om-
nipresence" of common law rules (often embodied in the Re-
statement of Torts, or the Restatement of Property) that is mani-
festly, but imperfectly, connected with the law in any given state.
It is useful to give two illustrations of this process. In Ruck-
elshaus v Monsanto Co,' an elaborate discussion of the constitu-
tionality of certain provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") turned in part on whether
the chemical formulas submitted for registration under the Act
were private property for the purposes of the Takings Clause.
The Court did not seek to fashion a brand new definition of trade
348 US 26 (1954) (reviewing federal urban renewal legislation and deferring to state and
federal public use determinations).
" See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain ch 9-10 (Harvard 1985) (discussing takings and the police power); Emily
Sherwin, The Geometry of Property Rights 30-33 (unpublished manuscript on file with U
Chi L Rev) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence involving somewhat malleable stan-
dards to be applied to government regulations); Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272
US 365, 387 (1926) (discussing "elasticity" of constitutional principles when applied to
zoning ordinances).
" For a textbook illustration of the process, see Ohio Oil Co v Indiana, 177 US 190,
210-11 (1900), which first notes the need to have regulation over common pool resources
in oil and gas, only to hide behind a claim of legislative deference when faced with a
scheme that favors one class of users (in-state drillers of natural gas) over a second class
of users (out-of-state drillers of oil) when the two sets of uses are inconsistent. For criti-
cism of the decision on this ground, see Richard A. Epstein, Modern Uses of Ancient Law
19-24 (manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev, forthcoming in 48 SC L Rev).
" 467 US 986 (1984).
[64:21
Takings Exchange
secrets, but contented itself with accepting Missouri's word-for-
word adoption of the language of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.13 And in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council," Justice
Scalia's inconclusive ruminations about the scope of property
rights gravitated toward the definition of a common law nuisance
found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 5 These illustrations
serve as useful reminders that the rationalization of common law
principles in practice turns out to be somewhat tidier than the
actual law of any (let alone every) jurisdiction. The effort to avoid
the rights skepticism of the first alternative thus requires us to
strip the common law of most of its warts and to present it in a
somewhat idealized form. But lest it be thought an extravagant
enterprise, it is just this view that dominates the First Amend-
ment, where the Supreme Court resists any effort by legislatures
to define certain conduct as a public nuisance before issuing an
injunction. 6 Rather, in area after area, only a strong conception
of substantive rights supports the strict, or dare one say the in-
termediate, scrutiny of government action.
What then allows courts, when defining constitutionally pro-
tected rights, to diverge from actual common law decisions in a
particular jurisdiction? Here one can think of several answers.
First, the Constitution applies to all states equally and uni-
formly. When the Fifth Amendment states that private property
cannot be taken for public use without just compensation, one
can hardly suppose that a state is able to deflect the power of
this constitutional command by defining property in ways that
exclude some of its essential attributes. It would be indefensible,
albeit convenient, for any state to limit property rights to the
right of bare possession, thereby completely depriving property
owners of their rights of use or disposition. The framers did not
consecrate the rights of property solely to insure that govern-
ments had suitable objects of taxation. Similarly, lesser restric-
tions should not escape suspicion either: suppose that X is the
owner of Blackacre, what should be made of a law that allows his
neighbors to graze their cattle on his property as of right without
his consent? The conversion of private property into a commons
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 757, comment b (1979), defining trade secrets,
quoted in Ruckelshaus, 467 US at 1001-04.
.4 505 US 1003 (1992).
" Id at 1025, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 822, comment g, 826-27, 828(a)-
(c), 830-31 (1979).
" See, for example, Lovell v City of Griffin, 303 US 444, 450-52 (1938) (rejecting a
statute that defined all distributions of literature without license as a "nuisance"); Er-
znoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205 (1975) (rejecting statutory definitions of public
nuisance in obscenity).
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presents many difficulties that will be addressed shortly, but
surely the one incorrect answer allows the state to classify the
owner's property rights as conveniently redefined, instead of ac-
knowledging that the rights have been abridged or eliminated.' 7
The second and broader answer addresses the ideal charac-
terization of the state's relationship with its citizens. It is
tempting to adopt the "positivist" stance that the state can never
"take" property because the state creates property rights and de-
fines the incidents of those rights in whatever way it sees fit. Yet
this conception of property is quite at odds with the notion of
limited government so central to our larger political tradition.
Thus, one powerful strand of the American constitutional tradi-
tion treats property as created by private actions alone. The
fumction of the state, therefore, is not to define property rights,
but to stabilize and protect the rights created exclusively by pri-
vate individuals in the course of their ordinary actions. That is
surely the dominant tendency in Lockean thought, and while it
may not be the only tradition to influence our constitutional or-
der-civic republicanism is another-it surely is one powerful
portion of our overall tradition and understanding.18
Too often, critics of this Lockean concept of private property
are also critics of natural law who assume that the "natural"
mode of creating private property (occupation of land, capture of
animals) has no content at all. But for our purposes, the role of
natural law, understood in opposition to political or civil law,
seems quite clear: if the rules are in accordance with the law of
nature, then the rights acquired in property are "bottom-up
rights" derived from individual acts of acquisition, not "top-down"
rights derived from the state's largesse. In fact, the natural law
tradition itself has always gravitated not only to a rule of first
possession (in land), but also to rights in common (in water)-
where neither set of rights is created by government decree. Once
these rights are parceled out by private actions--occupy the land
and gain the riparian rights-then the state can protect the
rights (by actions for trespass) and regulate them (by requiring
recordation of deeds). These rules do not merely yield efficient or
" See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L J 36, 61 (1964), which
seeks to define property as "the value which each owner has left after the inconsistencies
between the two competing owners have been resolved." The difficulty with this circular
definition is that it justifies whatever decision is made, but does nothing to prescribe
which decision should be made. Moreover, it utterly eliminates property as a barrier to
further state action. For criticism of the Sax approach, see generally Sherwin, The Ge-
ometry of Property Rights (cited in note 10).
" See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government 25-35, in Peter Laslett, ed,
Two Treatises of Government 265, 285-92 (Cambridge student ed 1988).
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sensible rights over property (although they do a far better job on
that score than is often supposed). These rules also serve a politi-
cal function. Acquisition by first possession and by grant are mu-
tually exclusive. Property acquired by first possession cannot be
acquired by government grant. The difference is not trivial. The
use of property acquired by first possession may be limited, but
only in ways that respect the rough equality of entitlement as be-
tween neighbors. It is no longer possible to say that state power
derived from some implied reservation in the original grant
which confers on the state some perpetual power of revision. No,
the state is put in its place, and it is given power over property
only to protect it, not to destroy it in the name of redefinition or
regulation.
This natural scheme of property rights serves double duty.
In addition to explaining the limitations on state power, it also
gives some content to the rights between citizens. This basic ap-
proach must satisfy two constraints. First, the rights must create
some parity between the individuals who hold them. When the
Lockean tradition says that all individuals are free, equal, and
independent in the state of nature, it gives equal weight to all
three elements. 9 As a first approximation, neighbors were free to
do what they wanted to do with their own property; they had
equal rights; and they had separate rights so that each could act
independently of the other. (The word "private" traces its etymo-
logical roots to the Latin, privus, or sole.) It would not do, there-
fore, to have a state of nature where A could exclude B from his
holdings while B could not exclude A from hers. ,
This initial condition of parity between neighbors is consis-
tent with several different assignments of rights. Thus each
party could pollute the other's land at will; neither could do so; or
both could pollute up to some low level set by the "live and let
live" rule.2" The ranking of these rules cannot be made by an ap-
peal to a principle of parity, but depends on selecting the rule
that maximizes the value to each party in the relationship. The
system therefore maximizes the sum of (1) the value of personal
uses and (2) the value of protection that each person enjoys from
use by another. Any rule that allows pollution at will, or entry
into a neighbor's land to destroy crops with impunity, is an obvi-
Id at 269-71, 4-6.
See Bamford v Turnley, 122 Eng Rep 27, 32-33 (Ex 1862) (Baron Bramwell)
("[R]eciprocal nuisances are of a comparatively trifling character. The convenience of such
a rule may be indicated by calling it a rule of give and take, live and let live."). For my
analysis of this principle, see Richard A- Epstein, For a Bramwell Revival, 38 Am J Legal
Ilist 246, 276-78 (1994).
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ous loser. The asserted parity of this rule only assures mutual
destruction. It hardly leads to an optimal selection of rights for
either party.
Conversely, the rule that allows no entry and no pollution
surely does a lot better than the first possibility, but it too is ca-
pable of a universal improvement if some low level nuisances
(whose use value is high and whose inconvenience to others is
low) were allowed. So much of the law of nuisance is best under-
stood as making a series of ever better approximations to an
overall objective: maximize the joint value of all properties sub-
ject to law, subject to the side constraint of equality of rights be-
tween neighbors." In each case, deviation from the strict bound-
ary conditions is designed to improve the overall position of the
parties without regard to the direction of the new deviation.
Thus, while the "live and let live" rule allows reciprocal inva-
sions, the rules requiring lateral support impose mutual restric-
tions against noninvasive conduct. In both cases the general
sense is that the benefits of the invasions tolerated, or the re-
strictions imposed, are greater than their respective costs.
Strictly speaking, each of these deviations from the sharp bound-
ary conditions improves the lot of all neighbors and satisfies a
very high standard of social welfare: everyone is left better off
under the new legal standard than they were under the old. Cer-
tainly no dispassionate observer of the present environmental
scheme could argue that the statutory replacements (for exam-
ple, Superfund, critical dune ordinances, zoning and the like) do
a better job at balancing the relevant concerns between neigh-
bors than do the common law rules they displace.' The theme of
equal treatment that resonates so strongly in the definition of
individual property rights thus carries over to the question of
their comprehensive modification by judicial rule. Nondiscrimi-
nation in treatment is therefore a vital protection against gov-
ernment abuse.
2 I think that there is a strong argument that the equitable side constraint of equal-
ity (which no one should find obnoxious) is in fact a derived quantity from the first con-
straint of maximized value. Without the parity constraint, someone has to decide who
gains the advantages, their size, and their duration. And at this point the discretion given
to government is intolerable. Introduce any public choice constraint into the exercise and
it becomes clear that allowing deviations from equality invites the usual rounds of rent-
seeking that will diminish the net value of any solution.
See, for example, Lucas, 505 US 1003 (refusing to uphold a coastal ordinance that
banned construction near the beachfront).
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II. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
With this conceptual framework in place, it is now possible
to return to the original question: how best to treat government
regulation of the right to exclude? To start with a simple case,
consider Kaiser Aetna v United States.' At its own expense, Kai-
ser Aetna transformed Kuapa Pond, a private body of water in
the company's possession, into a navigable marina that it used
and maintained for its own members. 4 When Kaiser Aetna broke
down the barrier that had separated its marina from the naviga-
ble waters of the United States, the federal government claimed
that Kuapa Pond became part of the navigable waters of the
United States, and, as such, the public was free to use the ma-
rina without interference or charge by the company." Waters
that were once private and exclusive became public waters by
federal decree. Assuming that the government was prepared to
pay the freight, Kaiser Aetna, as lessee of Kuapa Pond, could do
nothing to prevent its actions. But the question here was
whether the United States would have to pay compensation once
the waters in question were converted from private waters into a
common. The government resisted this conclusion by insisting
that the navigation servitude swept all aside, such that no prop-
erty rights were infringed, and hence no compensation was
owed.26
The key to making that argument goes back to Gibbons v
Ogden,27 the first of the great Commerce Clause cases that held
(correctly) that commerce among the several states included
navigation, which was thus within the power of Congress to
regulate. The leap from the power to regulate to the "navigation
servitude," although far more controversial than the issue of con-
gressional power faced in Gibbons, was made with stunning ra-
pidity and little reflection.28 No court has said that the power to
444 US 164 (1979).
Id at 167.
Id at 168.
Id at 170.
22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 89-93 (1824).
See, for example, United States v Twin City Power Co, 350 US 222, 224-25 (1956),
where the Court wrote:
The interest of the United States in the flow of a navigable stream originates in the
Commerce Clause. That Clause speaks in terms of power, not of property. But the
power is a dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any competing or
conflicting one. The power is a privilege which we have called "a dominant servitude"
or "a superior navigation easement." (citations omitted).
For earlier cases, see Scranton v Wheeler, 179 US 141, 163 (1900) ("[Tlhe rights of the ri-
parian owner are subject to the public easement or servitude of navigation."); United
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regulate land use, for example, necessarily creates a paramount
interest in land that sweeps aside all private claims. Yet exactly
that position became the received legal wisdom over water, which
involves the familiar spectacle of the Court running from an
oversight of the federal government, even during the misnamed
Lochner era. Why not require the government to respect the or-
dinary rights of access to a body of water that are everywhere re-
garded as incident to the riparian lands? The navigation servi-
tude may be sufficient to prevent individuals from taking steps to
block the flow of a river (for example, letting runoff silt up navi-
gable passages), but it hardly justifies converting private rights
into public ones. The original set of circumstances, however, did
not involve bodies of water that were once private and which
were held public only after their owners sought access to public
waterways. Yet the Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna did not re-
visit its earlier decisions but contented itself instead with the
protection of the right to exclude: "In this case, we hold that the
'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental ele-
ment of the property right, falls within this category of interests
that the Government cannot take without compensation."29 Pri-
vate property did not lose its essential attribute of exclusion even
though it was linked up with a navigable body of water. Access to
land and access to water were governed by the same principles.
The difficulties confronting Justice Rehnquist in Kaiser
Aetna stemmed from his evident need to distinguish the early
cases that had accorded paramount status to the navigation
easement. To do so, he made the sort of unprincipled concessions
to state power that reveal the lack of intellectual coherence in his
position. Thus he writes:
With respect to the [Kaiser Aetna] Marina, for example,
there is no doubt that Congress may prescribe the rules of
the road, define the conditions under which running lights
shall be displayed, require the removal of obstructions to
navigation, and exercise its authority for such other reason
as may seem to it in the interest of furthering navigation or
commerce.
30
States v Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co, 229 US 53, 70 (1913) ("[E]very such structure
in the water of a navigable river is subordinate to the right of navigation, and... must be
removed if Congress .. . shall determine that their continuance is detrimental to the
public interest.").
444 US at 179-80.
'0 Id at 174.
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But it cannot compel the use of this same Marina by outsiders
without compensation.
Pour quoi? To see the difficulty with his fragile accommoda-
tion, turn to the question of the federal government's power to
regulate a private road erected on private property connected to
the Interstate Highway system. Why does it fall to the govern-
ment, and not the private land owner, to indicate the terms and
conditions under which other persons should be let onto his prop-
erty? If the owner wants lower speed limits than the government
thinks necessary, should the government's will prevail over the
owner's when it is not prepared to pay compensation (or to
shoulder the costs of any additional liability insurance attribut-
able to its conditions)? Once an owner has the right to exclude,
then the ability to set the terms and conditions of admission
should lead to the optimal use of the resource for all the parties
involved-as yet another of the seemingly countless applications
of the Coase theorem. If visitors are asked to take the risk of
submerged obstructions in private waters, then why should the
government contradict? The irresistible impulse to prop up the
government's plenary policies while denying them the particular
object at hand should be, in a word, resisted.
The question of private access to public waters also runs
smack into the recurrent prohibition of unconstitutional condi-
tions. 1 Suppose the government were to couch its regulations in
the form of a bargain, by saying, "you may have access to public
waters from your marina, but only if you allow members of the
public to use it free of charge." That bargain, if lawful, could eas-
ily produce the outcome coveted by the United States, for it is
doubtful that Kaiser Aetna's clients would value their exclusive
rights to use the marina if they were denied access to public wa-
ters. If so, then the inconvenience of having public craft on pri-
vate waters could easily be less than the increased rentals that
could be obtained by assuring access from the marina to those
public waters. The standard view of the subject is that all per-
sons have rights of access to public roads and waters as an in-
herent part of fee simple ownership. The loss of that right is a
taking that warrants compensation, and it will hardly do for the
government to sell back to private owners the same rights that
were part of their original ownership bundle.
But why are rights of access part of the original bundle? The
explanation lies in the constant need to define ownership rights
"' On which, for my general views, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State
(Princeton 1993).
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to minimize the bargaining breakdowns that result from erecting
monopoly blockades. Here the common law recognition of a right
of access to public property constrains the monopoly power of
government. The state's loss of the right to exclude counts for lit-
tle since public highways and public waters are open to everyone
in the first place. Attaching a condition to the traditional right
therefore reduces the overall value of the public and private
holdings in and near navigable waters, which is why the early
common law rules developed as they did. So a resort to the bar-
gain should not be allowed to save the particular statute in Kai-
ser Aetna. If the government wants to secure public access to the
private marina, it has to pay for it. Yet once the right to exclude
was preserved, the government's appetite for control disap-
peared. Any individual who wanted access to the marina could
negotiate directly with its owner whose services are supplied in
competition with others. The basic norm that the government can
stabilize, but not destroy, the institutions of common and private
ownership is the only sound basis for defending the outcome in
Kaiser Aetna.
III. OVERRIDING EXCLUSION
A. The Prima Facie Wrong
In the watershed case of PruneYard Shopping Center v Rob-
ins,32 the Court faced the power of the exclusivity principle, rela-
tive to the creation of the commons, in more graphic form. The
factual background of the dispute was simple enough: did the
owner of a shopping center have the right to exclude a political
group (in this case high school students protesting UN resolu-
tions condemning "Zionism") from distributing leaflets and soli-
citing petition signatures on the premises of his shopping center?
The obvious point of departure for this case is Kaiser Aetna with
its language on the fundamental importance of the right to ex-
clude. If Kaiser Aetna represents the law of land as well as the
law of water, then the unauthorized entry by the private parties
constitutes a prima facie violation of the right of property.
447 US 74 (1980). For the record, I should state that I worked on an unsuccessful
petition for certiorari in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v J.MB.
Real Estate Corp, 138 NJ 326, 650 A2d 757 (1994), cert denied, Short Hills Associates v
Coalition Against War in the Middle East, 116 S Ct 62 (1995). My opposition to Prune-
Yard long antedates that activity. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain 64-66 (Harvard 1985).
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B. Public Use
It is here, however that the complications begin. As a matter
of logic, there are two possible ways to view the right to exclude.
In its stronger sense, the right is absolute: no private party can
overcome it unless he procures the consent of the owner. This
strong statement of principle has been dubbed a "property right"
in the now standard terminology of Calabresi and Melamed 3 Al-
ternatively, the right to exclude could be regarded as defeasible
upon payment of just compensation. To continue with the termi-
nology of Calabresi and Melamed, the right to exclude is then
protected only by a liability rule, such that the owner of the right
can be forced to surrender it to an outsider upon payment of
compensation.
As a private law matter, ownership is routinely protected by
a strong "property rule" prohibiting purposive dispossession; a
taking is therefore a "liability rule" carve-out for cases of private
necessity-that is, cases where the entrant acts in imminent
peril of life or limb. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any func-
tioning society where individuals could occupy the house of a
stranger on the willingness to pay a cash assessment, as deter-
mined by a court some years after the fact. After all, the proposi-
tion asserted is perfectly general, so the second possessor is also
only protected by a liability rule. Matters are quickly subject to
endless complications if the first entrant is dispossessed before
he squares his accounts with the original owner. Just thinking
how a liability regime works itself out with an endless array of
allowable dispossessions is enough to show its instability and in-
efficiency in private disputes.
But the dislocation from sequential dispossessions upon
payment of just compensation does not rise to the same level
where the government takes property under its eminent domain
power. The sequence goes exactly one round because thereafter
no private party can wrest the property unilaterally from the
government. Indeed the prohibition against the state loss of
lands to private parties covers not only loss by condemnation, but
also loss by adverse possession. The universal common law rule
has long provided nullum tempus occurrit regi-no time runs
against the king.' So protecting property against state dispos-
session solely by means of a liability rule is certainly conceivable.
See generally Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972).
See A. James Casner, ed, 3 American Law of Property: A Treatise on the Law of
Property in the United States § 15.13 (Little, Brown 1952).
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The state action may be wise or foolish, but it has at least one
advantage. It does not cycle endlessly.
The constitutional scheme for the taking of property does
not, however, endorse the view that the government may take so
long as it is prepared to pay. Rather, the Takings Clause contains
unmistakable elements of both property and liability rules. The
state cannot condemn property unless it is for a public use (the
property rule) and when the taking is for public use, the state
must still pay just compensation (the liability rule). In dealing
with PruneYard, the first question is whether an entry into pri-
vate property for partisan political purposes should ever count as
an entry for public use, sufficient to justify a breach of the wall of
ownership. The classical definition of a use tracks the meaning of
public good as one that works a benefit to all members of the
group; yet here neither the owners nor the shoppers receives a
benefit.3 5 So far as the ordinary law of trespass is concerned, the
owners of the property are well within their right to exclude the
entrants, even if the entrants are prepared to pay just compensa-
tion for use of the space. Indeed, after PruneYard most cases
have held just that. 6 The discontinuity between the public and
private conceptions of property rights is all too evident here.
The public use requirement is uneasy in yet another respect.
The public use filter is concerned only with the use of the prop-
ert;y in question. Nothing turns on the nature of the property
used or occupied for public purposes. The protesters may prefer
to enter the common areas of public shopping centers because of
the easy access to large numbers of citizens and voters. But just
suppose the protesters wished to extend their campaign into
small stores, restaurants, or movie theaters. The Court would be
hard pressed to say constitutionally that the want of a public use
at long last allows the owner to bar the door. Speech in public
fora is protected on small roads as well as large highways. So
long as private property may be pressed into public service, dif-
ferences in its size, location or use seem irrelevant to the thresh-
old question of public use, however relevant they might be to the
question of just compensation. The exact limits of this logic have
yet to be tested, for the state courts that have allowed protesters
into malls have limited their right of entry to the common areas,
where they are subject to reasonable time, place and manner re-
"The classic account of the public goods problem is Mancur Olson, The Logic of Col-
lective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 1965).
' See New Jersey Coalition, 650 A2d at 769 (collecting cases holding that there is no
general constitutional right-state or federal-to free speech in privately-owned shopping
centers).
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strictions 7 So if the protesters should ever seek to expand their
theater of operations, one wonders whether some clever six-part
balancing test could stiffen the spine of the public use test. Could
candidates for public office commandeer private office space for
campaign headquarters, given the public importance of the is-
sues they debate? One hopes not, but finding the right form of
words to bar their entry will be tricky unless and until the Su-
preme Court backs off its ill-considered view that any
"conceivable" public purpose satisfies the public use require-
ment."
For the moment then, my uneasiness about allowing the pro-
tests on private property at all is just that-academic uneasi-
ness. Today in real litigation, the elastic nature of the public use
requirement dooms any effort to derail the protesters' case in
PruneYard. Today republican thought and the high value that it
places on all forms of participation in public debate is a strong in-
fluence in American constitutional jurisprudence.39 So for the
moment at least, the entry on private lands found in PruneYard
is classified, not as partisan speech, but as the quintessential
public activity. PruneYard's clear logic grants all political groups
equal access to shopping centers, and thus rules out any selective
preference for the original protesters. So the bottom line is that,
so long as state law will oblige, shopping centers can be con-
verted into a limited public forum open to political speech of all
shades and opinions. There are no traces of viewpoint discrimi-
nation that could make the particular use count as "private," or
suspect under applicable First Amendment doctrine."0
C. Substantive Defenses
Although the public use requirement of the Takings Clause
can be successfully finessed, the same cannot be said of the just
See, for example, id at 782-83.
See Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 241 (1984) ("[W]here the ex-
ercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,
the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use
Clause."). The case, however, does not explicitly address the speech issue.
' For the classic statement of this position, see Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets
and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Le-
gitimacy, 53 Ind L J 145, 150 (1977-78) (discussing public choice and public interest mod-
els of local government legitimacy, and claiming that the attainment of individual free-
dom depends on community values being jointly recognized and "determinable through
reasoned interchange among [members of a group]").
' The most important recent Supreme Court foray into this issue is in R.AV. v City
of St. Paul, 505 US 377 (1992). For the general distinction between content-based and
content-neutral restrictions, see Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L
Rev 46 (1987).
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compensation issue. PruneYard strips away the exclusive right of
use and converts a private shopping center into a limited com-
mons. In light of Kaiser Aetna, that conversion of property from
wholly private to partially public is, prima facie, a compensable
taking. Can any new considerations be introduced in this context
to block that same conclusion? This question raises a large num-
ber of hidden complications because the wall of exclusion is sub-
ject to multiple attacks that go beyond the private necessity
cases. In principle, the wall could be breached with the consent of
the owner, in which case the right to exclude has been waived,
not overcome. Or the restriction could be overcome if the exclu-
sion is a source of some wrong to others, which might be included
in the class of nuisances (here more public than private). Third,
it could be argued that even if compensation is required, it is
nonetheless supplied because the rule affords advantages to all
private owners of shopping centers that they could not voluntar-
ily achieve among themselves. Or, one might argue that the mall
owners suffered no damages. And last, it could be argued that
the uncompensated breach of the right to exclude is warranted in
this case because it satisfies the requirements of a robust protec-
tion of freedom of speech, if not under the First Amendment,
then under the analogous state provisions devoted to that same
end. In fact, each of these propositions has been raised in defense
of PruneYard. The remainder of my argument is to show that
each is as wrong as it is ingenious.
1. Consent.
As a matter of private law, the property owner's consent to
entry and use should count as a complete defense to the taking or
use of property. The institution of ownership gives people the
right to exclude, not because they will invariably exercise it, but
so that they can select those individuals to whom they will ex-
tend permission to enter their property. The right to exclude is
good against the world, and permission then isolates those indi-
viduals who are entitled to use the property subject to whatever
terms and conditions the owner chooses to impose. In the ordi-
nary law of business invitees and social guests, consent makes
entry lawful even if it does not confer any property interest on
the entrants that allows them to stay after the owner has re-
voked the permission to enter.4' Furthermore, in the law of
leases, the owner can give the entrant exclusive possession of all
or part of the premises for the period of time covered by the
" See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 332 et seq (1965).
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agreement. A combination of leases and licenses permits the ef-
fective deployment and use of property. It is quite inconceivable
that any system of private rights would be regarded as complete
or satisfactory if the owner's exclusivity hardened into a duty as
well as a right.
It is, therefore, no surprise that Justice Rehnquist sought to
invoke the role of consent in order to distinguish this case from
his earlier decision in Kaiser Aetna:
Most important, the shopping center by choice of its owner is
not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a
business establishment that is open to the public to come
and go as they please. The views expressed by members of
the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures
for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of
the owner.42
Justice Rehnquist thus creates an opposition between property
that is reserved for personal use and property that is open to the
public generally. His implicit assumption is that these two ex-
tremes exhaust the universe of logical possibilities. Since we are
not dealing with a case of personal use, then the owner has given
consent to all those who wish to use the property, at least for
public purposes.
His argument is plausible only because of its manipulation of
the general principles of consent. Consent is the embodiment of
personal choice, and it allows individuals to select the persons
whom they admit and the purposes for which they are admitted.
It may well be that, as a background condition, entry to the
shopping center is open to all, but once certain persons are ex-
plicitly told they are not welcome, then the consent is withdrawn
as to them and their entry from that time forward is a garden va-
riety common law trespass.'
In the shopping center cases, the removal of consent from
the individual users takes place in two ways. First, there is a
general posting of the purposes for which entry is allowed, and if
these notices are read by the entrants before entry, then their
4 PruneYard, 447 US at 87 (1980). The particular passage is uttered in connection
with the First Amendment issues in the case, which I discuss in Section III.C.5. But the
view is widely taken. See, for example, Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp,
458 US 419, 434 (1982), which noted that the Court in PruneYard "upheld a state consti-
tutional requirement that shopping center owners permit individuals to exercise free
speech and petition rights on their property, to which they had already invited the gen-
eral public."
' See, for example, The Six Carpenters' Case, 77 Eng Rep 695, 696 (KB 1610) (holding
that abuse or violation of general consent to public entry is a trespass).
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initial entry is a trespass. Second, a specific request to leave
made after entry displaces any inference that is drawn from the
default position that all are welcome to enter the "public" spaces
of the shopping center. That exceptions from this default position
do take place is evident from the recent public stir that has ac-
companied the new policy in the Bloomington, Minnesota Mall,
one of the nation's largest, not to allow children under sixteen in
the mall at night unless they are accompanied by an adult."
Clearly steps like this are not lightly taken, but the rationale for
this particular maneuver is not unrelated to the issue of whether
political protesters may use mall property as of right. Clearly in-
vitations are qualified in order to satisfy both the needs of cus-
tomers and to maximize the net returns to the mall's owners,
ends that are congruent in the case at hand.
Once the mall owners state their position, Justice
Rehnquist's most important point is thus a flat analytical error:
these business establishments are not "open to the public to come
and go as they please."45 Unlike public streets and parks, where
no individuals enjoy a right to exclude, shopping malls are
opened-by owners-only to some members for some purposes.
No hypothetical "essence" of shopping centers prevents the invo-
cation of consent on a selective basis and thus Rehnquist's argu-
ment is not plausible. We should be less concerned with Aristo-
telian categories than with the actual manifestation of individual
consent or the withdrawal of such consent. It is not possible
therefore to save the result in PruneYard by an appeal to any co-
herent account of consent when what is offered is little more
than the imposition of a nondiscrimination principle on private
owners: if you are willing to admit shoppers, then you cannot dis-
criminate against protesters. Consent is not a tied good, to be ex-
ercised on an all-or-nothing basis. Consent is divisible, and can
be conditioned in an incalculable number of ways. It can be exer-
cised by broad brush or by fine strokes. That choice lies with the
owner, not with the state. The mere fact that the shopping center
resisted one party's claim for entry is evidence of the falsity of
that conclusion.
The divisible nature of consent, if accepted, narrows the
scope of the consent defense in many other settings as well. The
sit-in strikes of the 1960s were designed to open restaurants and
similar establishments to blacks when owners wished to exclude
Robyn Meredith, Big Mall's Curfew Raises Questions of Rights and Bias, NY Times
Al, Al (Sept 4, 1996).
PruneYard, 447 US at 87.
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them as a matter of right. When these entries were held not to be
trespasses, the suggestion was often made that the owner had
consented to the entrance by opening up the premises to the
public at large and could not therefore exclude black patrons.
Thus, when Justices Douglas and Goldberg argued against the
application of the Maryland trespass laws in the sit-in cases by
speaking about "extending an invitation to the public,"46 or by
pointing out that restaurants "daily open their doors to millions
of Americans,"47 they engaged in the same dubious reasoning that
Justice Rehnquist employed in PruneYard. There are clear justi-
fications for some use of the antidiscrimination norm for public
accommodations--of which legal monopoly is the most nota-
ble4 -- but consent, either express or implied-in-fact, is not one of
them. Those who are explicitly and unambiguously asked to stay
off the property have not been invited to enter it at the pleasure
of the owner. The purported consent of the owner cannot defeat
the just compensation obligation of the state, even if the public
use barrier is successfully overrun.
Similarly, the logic of consent was improperly applied in the
recent case of Yee v City of Escondido, California,49 where Justice
O'Connor took the position that since the land owners initially
had invited the mobile home owners onto their premises for a
limited period of time, they could not protest when state legisla-
tion barred eviction of the mobile home tenants (save for non-
payment of the rent) at the end of the lease: "Put bluntly, no gov-
ernment has required any physical invasion of petitioners' prop-
erty."" Put equally bluntly, only government intervention pre-
vents the owner from removing the entrant at the expiration of
the lease. But once again the question is not only whether there
was consent as such, but whether there was consent to the act
performed. If I allow my neighbor to enter my backyard, she does
not have my consent to enter my living room or to take my sil-
verware. When I consent to her presence in the yard for a day,
she does not thereby receive consent to remain there for a week.
The temporal dimension in the consent equation is as strong as
the spatial, and the principle of divisibility applies to time with
the same vigor that it applies to space. Consent cannot be forced
into an all-or-nothing, today-is-forever mold by government
Bell v Maryland, 378 US 226, 253 (1964) (Douglas concurring).
4 Id at 312 (Goldberg concurring).
< For the classic statement of this view, see Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public
Callings as a Solution to the Trust Problem, 17 Harv L Rev 156 (1904).
. 503 US 519 (1992).
Id at 528.
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command. Rather, as a private law notion, the owner has con-
tinuous and separate choices over when consent can be offered.
He may define the scope of consent by space, by time, or by con-
dition, to as fine a grain as fits his interest. Imposing the all-or-
nothing constraint is a form of regulation that carries with it the
unhappy consequence of blocking useful arrangements that de-
pend on limited and conditional consent: who would let a house
for a year if he could not regain possession at the end of the
term? Making consent operative only in large chunks represents
a manifest injustice when applied to ongoing arrangements by
allowing a person to enter under one set of terms and to stay,
perhaps forever, under another. All rent control statutes have
the consequence of transforming holdover tenants, whom the
owner could treat as trespassers at common law,5' into perpetual
lessees. It was judicial ingenuity worthy of Justice Holmes52 that
started the case law down the wrong path on which it continues
today. 3
2. Public Nuisance.
A second approach to the problem stated in PruneYard has
been proposed by Frank Michelman in his provocative comments
to the conference version of this article and renewed with charac-
teristic vigor here. 4 The central point of Michelman's comments
was that, while the consent line of defense failed in PruneYard, a
second line of defense held. In his view, the case could be recon-
ciled with my general approach to takings law. The police power
is not an empty conception under any view of the Takings
Clause, even if the text does not explicitly embrace it. So how
should that police power be defined? My own view links it to the
prevention of tortious conduct by other persons, which in the
land use context quickly ties the scope of the police power to the
common law of nuisance. But that connection to nuisance law is
" Crechale & Polles, Inc v Smith, 295 S2d 275, 277-78 (Miss 1974) (confirming that a
holdover tenant is a trespasser if the landlord does not consent to a new lease).
5' Block v Hirsh, 256 US 135, 157-58 (1921) (upholding a temporary rent control stat-
ute that prohibited landlords from ousting tenants at the end of a lease).
See, for example, Cromwell Associates v Mayor and Council Of the City of Newark,
211 NJ Super 462, 469, 511 A2d 1273, 1276 (1985) (sets out the current position author-
izing the landlord to charge cost-justified increases in rent, assuming that the market will
bear them, but does not even consider allowing him rental increases to reflect a shift in
the demand for rental housing). In effect the landlord bears the risk of depreciation while
the tenant gains the benefit of the appreciation in the unit, a "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose"
proposition.
' See Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost
Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev 57 (1997).
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subject to one central difficulty of constitutional interpretation.
Does constitutional interpretation depend on standard concep-
tions of key concepts distilled from multiple common law juris-
dictions? Or must it try to make peace with the small variations
in doctrine that inevitably crop up as different courts elaborate
and refine any critical legal concept.5 I confess that I do not
think that this problem is as large as it is sometimes made out to
be if only because the level of agreement across states is far
greater than is sometimes supposed, in part because of the uni-
fying forces created by the Restatements and the standard trea-
tises on the subject. The legal concepts in question are not so
malleable as is often supposed.
Professor Michelman takes a different view and regards the
variation and plasticity of common law as defeating any static
conception that one might take of the overall subject.56 In his
view, once I open up the Takings Clause to a public nuisance ex-
ception, say for the quite sensible reason that the ownership of
property does not allow individuals to discharge wastes into pub-
lic waters or throw their filth onto public lands, then I have to
deal with the following situation, which is best recounted in his
own words:
Lawmakers may conclude with good reason that processes of
suburban and exurban development have been a direct con-
tributing cause of the socially costly degradation suffered by
urban-center spaces. Furthermore, these destructive exur-
banizing processes (which is not to say that the processes
have not also been constructive) have been fueled by the pri-
vate provision of shopping malls, which have contributed to
the destruction of urban-center civic commons and their at-
tendant social capital. Why would not this platitudinous ob-
servation give the lawmakers just cause to require the mall
developers, or their successors in title, to contribute in apt
fashion to replacing the social values their profit-seeking
pursuits have helped to destroy?"
The gist of the proposal in a word is that opening the malls
up to political activity supplies some level of compensation for
the losses attendant to the creation of malls in the first place, so
that a quid pro quo has been enacted. I think that this ingenious
argument fails for the following reasons.
See text accompanying note 16.
"' For an elaboration of this view generally, see Richard A. Epstein, The Static Con-
ception of the Common Law, 9 J Legal Stud 253 (1980).
, Michelman, 64 U Chi L Rev at 64 (cited in note 54) (citation omitted).
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First, the case does not present any close challenge to the
ordinary definitions at common law, even if we allow for the
kinds of variations that creep into so decentralized a system of
decisionmaking. For these purposes at least, Prosser on Torts is
an accurate barometer of the present state of affairs. He begins
his section on public nuisance with the standard definition of Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen that refers to an act or omission
"which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public
in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects.""8
At one level, this definition could be creatively read to support
the Michelman hypothesis: "the inconvenience to the public"
could come in setting up an inducement for ordinary people to
abandon the downtown shopping area. But a quick look at the
list of wrongs that have been found under the definition of public
nuisance does not include any that resemble the competitive in-
jury that is implicit in the Michelman definition. Instead we are
treated to a long list that features:
interferences with the public health, as in the case of a hog-
pen, the keeping of diseased animals, or a malarial pond;
with the public safety, as in the case of the storage of explo-
sives, the shooting of fireworks in the streets, harboring a
vicious dog, or the practice of medicine by one not qualified;
with public morals, as in the case of houses of prostitution,
illegal liquor establishments, gambling houses, indecent ex-
hibitions, bullfights, unlicensed prize fights, or public pro-
fanity; with the public peace, as by loud and disturbing
noises, or an opera performance that threatens to cause a
riot; with the public comfort, as in the case of bad odors,
smoke, dust and vibration; with public convenience, as by
obstructing a highway or a navigable stream, or creating a
condition which makes travel unsafe or highly disagreeable,
or the collection of an inconvenient crowd; and in addition,
such unclassified offenses as eavesdropping on a jury, or
being a common scold.59
It seems that within this list of apparent diversity lies an
underlying unity as to the kinds of conduct that are actionable
interferences. Most of these involve the threat or danger of
physical force or invasion, which operate on public spaces in a
W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 90 at 643 (West 5th
ed 1984 & Supp 1988), quoting with alterations Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, General
View of the Criminal Law of England 105 (MacMillan 2d ed 1890).
' Prosser on Torts § 90 at 643-45 (cited in note 58) (with twenty-four footnotes most
definitely omitted).
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manner similar to actions that count as private nuisances when
directed against privately owned lands and water. The remainder
are moral charges, which often have undesirable neighborhood
effects that can lead to the commission of garden variety crimes.
The definition of public nuisance, however, is not indefinitely
plastic, for Prosser goes on categorically to state that "[alt com-
mon law, a public nuisance was always a crime, and punishable
as such." ° And he adds in a footnote that "[no case has been
found of tort liability for a public nuisance which was not a
crime."6 The definition of crime refers to the common conception
of crimes. The definition of a public nuisance does not remotely
fit the kinds of activities that go on at any mall. The large, self-
contained area reduces the negative externalities on neighbors,
and the customers who enter the premises can leave if they do
not like the mix of activities undertaken. Some malls are de-
signed exclusively for shopping and thus encourage quiet deco-
rum. Others are fun places to be for the young and carefree. It
hardly matters what portion of the market any individual mall
caters to, for the nature of the benefits to mall customers hardly
makes its activities a public nuisance that sets the stage for pro-
viding some in-kind competition to its disappointed competitors.
Indeed, it would be odd to attach this status to the shopping
mall, when everything from the NBA Finals to treks in the Cat-
skills draws people away from the city center. The paradigm shift
that is captured in the cases is quite simple. Competition ex-
pands the alternatives open to all people; and the doctrine of tort
law should not be read or interpreted to treat competitive indus-
try as a harm to disappointed competitors.62
In urging this point of view, I am not tailoring the law of
nuisance to fit the law of property. The freedom of speech cases
have also addressed whether certain forms of conduct could be
statutorily defined as a public nuisance. The cases have uni-
formly followed the rules for defamation, preventing the state
from defining its offenses (even by common law) to make words
or conduct actionable without some conceptually sound defini-
tion, which, when all the huffing and puffing is done, looks very
much like the common law rules or some variation thereof. Thus
in Lovell v City of Griffin, an ordinance that "deemed a nuisance"
the distribution of handbills and leaflets without the permission
of the city manager was quickly dispatched in part because the
Id at 645.
, Id at 645 n 33.
For an expansion of this theme, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-And
How it Grew, 45 U Toronto L J 369, 389-95, 408-09 (1995).
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ordinance was "not limited to 'literature' that is obscene or offen-
sive to public morals or that advocates unlawful conduct." 3 The
echoes of the common law definitions reverberate loudly in the
constitutional decisions.
Moreover, the evolution of the PruneYard rule does not sup-
port Michelman's contention that legislation reflects the commu-
nity's disdain for the mall's usurpation of the commons. The tip-
off lies in Michelman's description of the "lawmakers" who decide
to open up the mall to political activity by outsiders." In both
California and New Jersey, state legislatures and city councils
played no role in fashioning the rules that allowed political pro-
tests to take place on private property against the will of the
owners. Instead the entire process from soup to nuts was the
outgrowth of judicial decisions. It is not difficult to see why this
should be the case. As a first point, it is hardly clear that the
separation of uses counts as a social detriment (as Michelman's
argument implicitly presupposes). Obviously, the shopping mall
reflects the interests of its patrons when it imposes the restric-
tion in question. Many people do not want to be exposed to the
political controversy at all, and those who do can find lots of
other outlets, from the Internet to the mass media, to participate
in political activity. The municipalities that depend on the sales
and real estate taxes generated by the malls may be reluctant to
jeopardize these revenue streams by driving customers away
from them. And, paradoxically, some political groups may be
quite happy to attract smaller groups to their demonstrations, if
they could gather in places where the rallies would not generate
local hostility.65 So all in all, I think that the owners of these me-
ticulously maintained and closely managed malls can escape
with dignity the charge of public nuisance.
3. Collective Action Problems.
Lillian BeVier's comments take a very different approach.66
Whereas Professor Michelman is happy to deconstruct tradi-
tional categories of property law, Professor BeVier is in general
-303 US 444, 447, 451 (1938).
"Michelman, 64 U Chi L Rev at 64 (cited in note 54).
"See Hague v Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 US 496, 515 (1939)
(Roberts opinion) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemo-
rially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing pub-
lic questions.").
"Lillian R. BeVier, Give and Take: Public Use as Due Compensation in PruneYard,
64 U Chi L Rev 71 (1997).
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sympathetic to the traditional classifications, and even with sub-
stantial portions of my views on the Takings Clause. Nonethe-
less, she takes issue with me in this case and applies one of the
traditional justifications for overriding exclusive property rights
as an explanation for the result in PruneYard. Thus she notes
that the standard public good arguments offer a strong justifica-
tion for limiting property rights, including the core right of exclu-
sion." The usual argument holds that where the benefit in ques-
tion is widely shared, no individual will have the correct incen-
tives to produce that benefit if he has to bear all of the costs of
production while enjoying only some portion of the benefit. A
rule, such as that applicable for special assessments for local im-
provements, could allow the imposition of burdens on individuals
who receive net benefits from the collective undertaking.68 Thus
if the road costs one thousand and each of one hundred owners
benefits by fifteen, then a special assessment of ten per unit on
each owner allows for the construction of a facility from which
each abutting landowner gains. No voluntary contract could ever
achieve that particular result.
Professor BeVier's arresting suggestion is that the owners of
the various shopping centers face a collective action problem.
Each of them would be quite happy to admit some protesters to
its property so long as other shopping centers followed the same
policy. But each shopping center owner fears that if he alone
opens up to demonstrators, he will suffer a competitive disadvan-
tage when a disproportionate number of these protesters are
drawn to his mall. A state-supplied rule mandating access could
avoid this problem. Formally, the proposal could be true, but fac-
tually I believe that it is false for two reasons.
First, it was clear during the New Jersey Coalition69 litiga-
tion that the shopping center owners and their trade association
collectively opposed the litigation. The revealed behavior on both
fronts suggests that each of the mall owners independently op-
posed state intervention because the loss of the power to exclude
interfered with each owner's ability to manage the property effec-
tively, wholly without regard to other malls' policies. To be sure,
the selective imposition of a duty to admit could hurt some shop-
On which see Olson, The Logic of Collective Action at 14-16 (cited in note 35).
On which see generally Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Bene-
fit Taxation: Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J Legal Stud 201
(1983).
' New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v J.M.B. Realty Corp, 138 NJ
326, 650 A2d 757 (1994), cert denied, Short Hills Associates v New Jersey Coalition
Against War in the Middle East, 116 S Ct 62 (1995). The original lawsuit featured nine
shopping center defendants.
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ping malls more than others, but it hardly follows from that ob-
servation that the general rule results in an across-the-board im-
provement. It could equally well result in a pro rata set of losses,
whose sum is greater than the loss borne by a single shopping
center if it alone opened its premises to protesters.
Second, it is far from clear that the shopping center owners
shared equal levels of opposition to the program. In the New Jer-
sey Coalition litigation, Short Hills Associates, which operates
upper-end shopping centers and maintains the most rigorous set
of restrictions, was the only owner prepared to file a petition for
certiorari" notwithstanding the evident difficulty of getting the
Supreme Court to review the PruneYard decision after its hold-
ing had been explicitly afied on several occasions.7 The cost
to Short Hills Mall of changing its ambiance was greater than
that to other shopping centers that occupied different market
niches. There is really no surprise here, for some level of varia-
tion should be expected in every population, whether of individu-
als or organizations. Yet that level of variation makes it quite
possible that on some occasion, one or more shopping center
owners might find some advantage to allowing protesters in, or
at least cash payments could persuade the owners to allow that
activity at prices lower than those others would charge. But a ju-
dicial rule prevents the emergence of any market mechanism to
match the potential demonstrations with the site that provides
the maximum benefit, net of local inconvenience.
In reading through Professor BeVier's paper, I quickly sense
that she is less troubled about the outcome in PruneYard than
she is about the collateral consequences of rejecting its views on
exclusivity. More specifically, she is worried that if PruneYard
falls, then the public accommodations provisions of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 19642 will fall as well. After all, that statute
authorizes a removal of the right to exclude in cases where no
consent is forthcoming, and where the owner of the public ac-
commodation has not created a public nuisance. I have observed
that the enforcement of Title II has been an unqualified success
in practice largely because, once the rocky transition period was
See Short Hills Associates v Coalition Against War in the Middle East, 116 S Ct 62
(1995) (denying certiorari).
7 Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419, 434 (1982); Pacific Gas
& Electric Co v Public Utility Commission, 475 US 1, 12 (1986) (plurality); Dolan v City of
Tigard, 114 S Ct 2309, 2321 (1994).
Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 USC §§ 2000(a) et seq (1994).
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over, no one saw fit to oppose it.73 I see no practical reason to re-
peal Title II precisely because it has been largely self-enforcing.
Even so, I do think it important to indicate the appropriate
scope of the nondiscrimination principle. In my view, the nondis-
crimination obligation clearly attaches to all publicly owned land,
regardless of the purpose for which it is used. The nondiscrimi-
nation obligation also extends to the owners of private facilities
who have local monopolies in the provision of certain services,
which was historically the case with the common carriers and
innkeepers.74 But it is important to state the reason for this prin-
ciple. It is not that these properties are simply important. It is
that innkeepers and common carriers historically had a monop-
oly position and the obligation to take all comers at a reasonable
price was the best way to curb that power. When the monopoly
position is lost, as is typically the case with restaurants, the obli-
gation to receive all comers should cease. This approach makes a
huge difference in practice not because of questions of race, sex,
and age, but because of the extensive new obligations imposed on
owners of public accommodations, broadly defined, under the
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 5 Here the nondis-
crimination obligation has been transformed into one of equal ac-
cess regardless of cost. Even within the traditional logic of the
common carrier rules, the ADA is something of an anomaly be-
cause it does not require each customer to cover the cost of his
service, as the older rules did. But it is far easier to introduce an
extensive set of obligations if the barrier of exclusivity has first
been overcome by the initial antidiscrimination rules on public
accommodations. The upshot, two generations later, is an enor-
mous public works program that imposes heavy private costs for,
in many cases, limited public benefits. So my fear in the end is
the opposite of Professor BeVier's. She is afraid that the principle
of Title II will be compromised where it matters the most. My
view is that if Title II were scrapped tomorrow, shopping center
owners would scramble to proclaim to the world that all persons
were welcome into their malls regardless of race or sex. They
would certainly pause before they made the same promise with
respect to age, given some difficulties in controlling teenagers at
night. Nor do I think that they would be in the slightest hostile to
" See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Dis-
crimination Laws 126-29 (Harvard 1992).
4 See, for example, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments § 476 (Little
Brown 9th ed 1878) (James Schouler, ed); Bell v Maryland, 378 US 226, 296-300 (1964)
(Goldberg concurring) (gathering authorities).
' Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC §§ 12101 et seq (1994).
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persons with disabilities. The ill will from exclusion would prove
very costly to them. But I do think that the kinds of accommoda-
tions that they would be prepared to make would be far less ex-
travagant and wasteful than those now required under the law.
Professor BeVier should not blink or abandon her strong in-
stincts toward limited government when faced with the challenge
of what happens to Title II.
4. Damages.
Thus far I have addressed the substantive arguments used
to defend the decision in PruneYard. Yet another approach posits
that deprivation of the right to exclusivity caused no damages.
Here, as the Supreme Court has rightly reminded us, the basic
position of the Takings Clause is that the owner's loss, not the
gain to the state, provides the basic measure of compensation.76
But on this issue too the Court in PruneYard takes a naive view.
It assumes that there were no damages to speak of because the
mall's other economic activities could proceed side-by-side with
the petitioners' solicitations, and the owners were free to intro-
duce reasonable "time, place, and manner regulations that will
minimize any interference with its commercial functions.""
But just as the PruneYard decision misunderstands the logic
of property rights, so too it misunderstands the logic of harm and
compensation. Time, place, and manner regulations do not grow
on trees. They have to be promulgated and defended against par-
ties who argue that the restrictions are a mere pretext to the now
forbidden rule of exclusion. Yet the costs of meeting this judicial
obligation are not compensated under the applicable legal rule,
but are borne by the landowner who lacks the taxing power to de-
fray the expenses.
More importantly, this conception of value assumes that the
only compensable losses are those measurable economic losses
associated with the intrusion. Yet if these are as close to zero as
the Court seems to suppose, then we should be hard-pressed to
explain why any shopping center insists, often vehemently, on a
no-solicitation-no-distribution rule. That policy is itself costly to
enforce, so that private parties would only incur the relevant
costs if they perceived some (subjective) benefit of an equal or
greater amount. For these purposes, it is not critical that the
'7 See United States v Miller, 317 US 369, 375 (1943) ("[T]he owner is to receive no
more than indemnity for his loss, his award cannot be enhanced by any gain to the
taker.").
' 447 US at 83.
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Court identify what this benefit is. But it should be willing to
presume that property owners know enough about their own
businesses to decide what policies are, or are not, in their own
best interests.
Yet the explanation for the no-distribution policy is not diffi-
cult to find. The operation of a shopping center depends on the
creation of an ambiance in its public and private spaces. The con-
sistency in appearance and product line is generally thought to
be absolutely essential to a shopping center's ability to attract
and hold the right kind of paying customer base. Any doubters of
this general proposition need only consult Malcolm Gladwell's
New Yorker article, The Science of Shopping.8 The article pres-
ents the theories of Paco Underhill, a prominent retail consultant
for whom success and failure are both found in the small details
in design and location that ordinary observers, and indeed pro-
fessional retailers, could easily overlook. Visual cues seem to
matter for everything: windows have to be slanted at just the
right angle to be accessible to viewer traffic. Displays must be
angled to the right, which is the natural direction in which shop-
pers go in entering a store-so great is the principle of the In-
variant Right. No items of value should be located in the Decom-
pression Zone, which shoppers pass through after leaving the
public space and entering the store.
The key to retailing, therefore, is total control and mastery
over interior spaces. If a political solicitation prevents customers
from lingering over coffee or window shopping, then the level of
sales, and hence of profitability, will fall, even if no particular
lost sale can be traced back to any particular political activity.
These "soft" costs are critical in making business decisions: they
are the stuff of the "practical knowledge" to which Hayek turns
when he explains the "impossibility of central planning" and di-
rection.79 Yet these costs are too often lost in the judicial judg-
ments about what happens.
Accordingly, the right rule for takings cases of this sort is to
take evidence on the diminution in property value as a result of
the intrusion in question. Although the evidence is hard to come
by, it is surely a mistake to place the burden of proof on the
shopping center owner before awarding any compensation. The
state which forces an involuntary loss on its citizens should not
' Malcolm Gladwell, The Science of Shopping, The New Yorker 66 (Nov 4, 1996).
Gladwell's work was inspired by William Whyte's earlier studies on public spaces such as
parks and plazas in order to see which worked and which did not. See William H. Whyte,
The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces (Conservation Foundation 1980).
' John Gray, Hayek on Liberty 25-26, 36-40, 83 (Basil Blackwell 1984).
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be allowed to use difficulties in estimating the cost of the loss to
evade an obligation to compensate. So the direct costs of allowing
the demonstration, the potential liabilities that stem from its op-
erations, some allocation for the space, a percentage of lost sales,
and some allowance for goodwill should be awarded, even if the
calculations are to some degree speculative given the soft (but
real) nature of the losses. And once these elements are allowed, it
is doubtful that the activity will continue, for demand falls as
price rises, and that is what the just compensation principle is all
about. It is doubtful that public funds would be invested in pay-
ing the compensation for a private group, and very doubtful that
the group would not shift to some other form of political activity
if forced to pay compensation: which is as it should be, for the
price component of the Takings Clause is designed to shift the
nature and intensity of both public and private activities.
5. The First Amendment.
The analysis of PruneYard has not yet run its course. Indeed
within the traditional doctrinal framework, the case marks a pro-
found transition from pure takings analysis to a multi-layered
case because of the ostensible collision of First Amendment and
Fifth Amendment values. It is an evident sign of intellectual con-
fusion when subtle First Amendment arguments can be routinely
raised on both sides of any dispute: protesters and demonstrators
are obviously engaged in speech-related activities, and claim that
the denial of entry derogates their First Amendment rights." Yet
the shopping center claims that it does not wish to be tagged
with the protesters' viewpoint or be required to subsidize their
activities by furnishing them with space and shopping center
amenities. The confusion is partially corrected by posting notices
and disclaimers, but the subsidy point cannot be answered by
any disclaimer: the Mall may oppose the message and still be re-
quired to dedicate its space to its advancement.
' Claims of this sort were in fact sustained in the pre-PruneYard decision of Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc, 391 US 308, 319
(1968) (accepting union picketing in a mall parking lot as protected by the First Amend-
ment), but were repudiated in Lloyd Corp v Tanner, 407 US 551, 562-63, 567-68 (1972)
which held that the First Amendment did not require the private owner of a shopping
center to allow entrance onto the property. Logan Valley was explicitly overruled in
Hudgens v NLRB, 424 US 507, 518-21 (1976). The decision in Lloyd did not, however,
prevent states from accepting the First Amendment arguments of the protesters, and
PruneYard is most notable for its agnosticism, by rejecting First Amendment claims of
both the entrants and the owners, and rejecting the owner's takings claim under the Fifth
Amendment.
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The hard question of constitutional interpretation is whether
one reads the First Amendment in opposition to the Fifth
Amendment or in harmony with it. Here the latter approach
seems to make far more sense, for why would anyone draft a
document whose neighboring commands systematically operate
at cross-purposes? In other settings, my right to speak does not
entail a right to use your telephone for long distance calls at your
expense. Small therefore is the perceived difference between
commandeering phones and commandeering space when both are
done without compensation. In response, it could be said that the
protection afforded a home is not the same protection that is af-
forded a shopping center because, to borrow a phrase from an
earlier era, the shopping center is "affected with the public inter-
est.
8
'
Unfortunately, this argument fundamentally misunder-
stands the logic of property rights. When two or more individuals
combine their rights, they do not gain any additional advantage
over third persons, but, by the same token, their combined efforts
should not subject them to any additional obligations either. The
rights and duties of both A and B are, so to speak, conserved
against the world. This constraint, moreover, binds no matter
how many times the rule is applied. What is good for A and B can
be carried out with a thousand persons as well as with two. Any
other rule induces strategic behavior by the original contracting
parties: either they will trade in order to gain rights against
third persons, or they will refrain from making trades that are
otherwise beneficial for fear that they will lose rights to third
persons. So long as the optimal adjustment is created (by the tort
law) between strangers, the existence of some voluntary transac-
tions ought not to scramble that which has been well done the
first time. The size of the individual holdings may vary but the
aggregate set of rights remains constant. The major, perhaps
sole, exception to this rule is when one group exerts a dominant
power over some given resource; but healthy competition,
whether among shops or shopping centers, erases this threat of
monopoly power. Antitrust law aside, the shopping centers
should not be regarded as sacrificing their right to exclude as
payment for their aggregation of separate land under common
ownership.
" See Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113, 126 (1876), quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale, De
Portibus Maris, in Francis Hargrave, ed, A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of
England 45, 78 (E. Lynch, et al 1787).
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It need not follow, however, that the combined owner will
seek to exercise its ownership rights in the same way as the
separate individuals who contributed to the common property.
Shopping centers do not make money by a remorseless policy of
exclusion-they make it by invitation-so we should expect the
terms and conditions to vary from that of shopowners as a func-
tion of the objectives of the owners in the combined scheme. But
it hardly follows that they should be found to surrender the
rights that they want simply because they have waived the rights
that they do not wish to preserve. The general public is invited to
shop because of the anticipated gains from their arrival. The po-
litical demonstrators are kept out because of the owner's antici-
pated business loss from their arrival. Both those actions make
sense, and there is no reason in law or principle why the two de-
cisions have to be linked under the First Amendment or any-
where else. The owners can admit one group and exclude the
others. The forces of competition will make sure that the gains
from all beneficial transactions are captured.
Stated otherwise, the logic of contract and exchange should
not be suppressed or deflected by any claim of freedom of speech.
Under the Constitution, the purpose of freedom of speech is not
simply to have more speech, but to have speech that fairly re-
flects the sentiments of the population at large.82 Covert subsi-
dies, such as those involved in PruneYard, are an enemy to free-
dom of speech every bit as much as explicit taxes or oppressive
regulations. Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that the proposed
rule of guaranteed access does not engage in any viewpoint dis-
crimination 3 is correct only at the formal, but not the practical
level. At ground level, it seems clear that some speakers (usually
those who are left-wing and antiestablishment types) will be far
more likely to commandeer these resources than will other
speakers. That implicit shift of resources is certainly permissible
in connection with the use of public fora that have from time out
of mind been open to all. But it is far more troublesome in this
context. As a general matter, freedom of speech is best protected
when property rights are well-defined. Whatever one thinks
about the merits of PruneYard, its impact on the overall political
discourse is tiny in comparison with rules that allow private in-
dividuals to own and operate their printing presses as they see
' Just that mistake is made, for example, in New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254
(1964), which in its zeal to insulate libel defendants from suits has allowed major griev-
ances to go unredressed. For my critique of that decision, see Richard A. Epstein, Was
New York Times v Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U Chi L Rev 782 (1986).
PruneYard, 447 US at 87-88.
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fit, or to conduct political meetings and rallies by invitation on
private property. PruneYard weakens those institutional sup-
ports to property by allowing individual owners to force their way
onto the property of others for political ends. But breach of the
public use wall should not excuse the protesters, or the state,
from paying compensation for pressing private property into
public service. Neither public use, nor consent, nor a desire for
more or better speech alters that conclusion.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF PRUNEYARD
The interaction between the Fifth and First Amendments
evident in PruneYard has also played a role in some subsequent
cases, and these too deserve brief comment. In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co v Public Utilities Commission,' the question before
the Court was who owned the "excess" space inside the billing
envelopes sent by Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E") to its custom-
ers. This space was created in virtue of the fact that even after
the bills had been included, the envelope could hold additional
material before the price of postage increased to the next level.
PG&E had used the space to distribute its own monthly newslet-
ter, but the Commission claimed that the space belonged to the
ratepayers and stipulated that certain groups that had opposed
PG&E in the past had a right to use the space four months out of
the year.
Here the Court struck down the requirement largely because
it required PG&E to use its property to express the viewpoints of
others. In so doing, it followed the tradition of Miami Herald
Publishing Co v Tornillo85 that held that newspapers could not be
converted into a common carrier of sorts by being forced to carry
the replies of other individuals whom they had criticized. In the
course of his plurality opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric, Justice
Powell distinguished PruneYard because it had not addressed
the question of forced association squarely raised when the mes-
sages included inside the billing envelope were antithetical to the
position of the Utility Company.86 Once again the question of the
commons obliquely arose when the Commission claimed that the
ratepayers owned the extra space inside the envelopes and they
could therefore do with their property what they pleased. The
Court observed that even if the ratepayers owned the excess
space, PG&E still owned the envelope and, therefore, could ex-
475 US 1, 11 (1986) (plurality).
418 US 241, 256-57 (1974).
475 US at 12.
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elude the undesired messages in order to make sure that its own
property, the envelope, was not pressed into the service of a hos-
tile cause.87
This tactic of evasion, however, does not answer two compli-
cations. First, if the excess space in the envelope is owned by the
ratepayers, then even if they cannot use it, surely they could ex-
clude PG&E from filling it to present its own messages: after all,
why should PG&E be able to use the ratepayers' property for its
own advantage? In effect, the split ownership between envelope
and excess space creates the standard holdout problem where
each side can veto any use by the other, such that neither side
can use the resource. Hence Justice Powell's insistence that
PG&E could carry on the traditional distribution of its newsletter
is not justified. Rather each side can barricade the other.
Second, if this envelope has split ownership, could the same
be said about all other envelopes that are sent by PG&E with ex-
cess space, including those sent to suppliers, advertisers, and the
like? The very purpose of the institution of property is to avoid
the legal creation of a commons that inhibits the Use of resources.
The areas of natural commons, such as water, provide instructive
examples where the efficient utilization of a resource is promoted
by shared ownership. The ordinary envelope does not have the
same array of rich and interlocking uses as a flowing river. Inde-
pendent of regulation, it seems clear that the space inside an en-
velope is always owned by the envelope owner, and there is no
reason why that result should change when dealing with a regu-
lated industry. There is no need for agnosticism on this particu-
lar point. It is quite enough to take the sensible position that the
state can only convert this private property into an odd sort of
commons upon payment of just compensation, which, in practice,
need not be calculated because the mere suggestion of a positive
price will scare away potential purchasers.
The second of the forced entry cases is Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc v United States," where the cable companies chal-
lenged the "must carry" provisions of the Cable Act of 1992.89 The
basic function of these provisions is to require cable networks to
carry the over-the-air signals of local broadcasters without
charge. The impetus behind the rule was the fear that the in-
creased penetration of cable could lead to the extinction of the
Id at 13.
114 S Ct 2445 (1994).
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-
385, 106 Stat 1460, 1471-77, codified at 47 USC §§ 534(b)(1)(B), 534(h)(1)(A), 535(a)
(1994).
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broadcast networks, causing special harm to homes that did not
purchase or could not reach cable television. Once again the case
was largely fought on First Amendment grounds. In that vein,
the Court first held that a standard of intermediate scrutiny ap-
plied to the restrictions," and then recognized that Congress had
an "important and substantial federal interest" in "protecting
noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting
service due to competition from cable systems."9'
The difficulties in Turner Broadcasting come from the pro-
tectionist rationale that bears a haunting resemblance to Profes-
sor Michelman's public nuisance explanation. Thus, while it
seems clear that competition always places established busi-
nesses at risk, the preservation of the old technology against the
incursions of the new hardly seems a ground on which to make
the cable companies into common carriers open to the traffic of
their business rivals. The networks have the option to shrink
their staffs, reduce their independent programming, and share
purchases with cable operators, in order to protect their busi-
ness, and if they fail, which is doubtful, it is difficult to see a so-
cial interest in propping them up. But even if the common carrier
status is imposed, why is there no compensation for the cable
companies? Here the conversion of private into common property
is a partial taking even if the case is suffused with First Amend-
ment issues. At the very least, some fraction of the advertise-
ment revenues or some standardized fee for service should be
part of the mix, similar to the pooled payments that are often
used in copyright cases.92 Indeed once the compensation is forth-
coming, there is less of a need to assess independently the bur-
dens that the must-carry provisions impose on the cable opera-
tors, which was yet another part of the program on remand.93 In-
stead, the price system could cushion the blow and give the cable
companies a revenue stream with which to expand their own ca-
' Turner Broadcasting, 114 S Ct at 2469. The intermediate scrutiny standard appli-
cable to content-neutral regulations is as follows:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 377 (1968).
" Turner Broadcasting, 114 S Ct at 2461, quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc v Crisp,
467 US 691, 714 (1984).
Fortnightly Corp v United Artists Television, Inc, 392 US 390 (1969); Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 USC § 111 (1994). For discussion, see J. Thorne, P. Huber, and M. Kellogg,
Federal Broadband Law § 10.6.2 (Little, Brown 1995).
" Turner Broadcasting, 114 S Ct at 2472.
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pabilities. Turner Broadcasting constitutes a serious error by as-
serting that the proper judicial role is to require an evaluation of
consequences from all points of view rather than require a cash
payment for the privilege of using someone else's resources.
CONCLUSION
The protection of private property under the Constitution
has not proceeded in an orderly or coherent way. All too often
there are ad hoc compromises that do not reflect a consistent
overview of how government ought to proceed. In contrast to the
now-accepted ways of doing business, it seems sensible to adopt a
principle that says, "the more you take the more you pay." That
rule can apply when the government takes six acres of land in-
stead of four. But it also applies when government forces the
holders of private property to surrender their right to exclude.
The size of the shifts in property rights should only determine
the amount of compensation. Yet in PruneYard, these obvious
principles were neglected. The consequences of that neglect are
not random, but seem systematically to favor the expansion of
government power for purposes that on balance are more mis-
chievous than beneficial. Righting the balance in takings law is
by now a familiar theme. But it is not one that has lost its ur-
gency through repetition.
